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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the process has restored some semblance of practicality to an area of
law which has engendered some very harsh results.
CPLR 7511(b)(1): Court establishes criteria for review of award ren-
dered at compulsory arbitration.
Much that has been theorized concerning article 75 is premised on
the notion that parties are free to select a private forum in which to
settle their disputes thereby waiving a portion of the substantive and
procedural law of the state.93 Implicit in many of the decisions regarding
arbitration is the attitude that since the parties have voluntarily agreed
to arbitrate they have no cause to complain if the proceedings are not
entirely satisfactory.94 Indeed, CPLR 7511(b)(1) reflects the judicially
created maxim that an arbitrator's award cannot be vacated for errors
of law or fact.95 Under this section, the grounds for overturning an
award focus primarily on the integrity of the participants and the
arbitrator rather than on the wisdom of the award.98
In addition to their refusal to scrutinize an arbitrator's award,
courts have also manifested a reluctance to examine the submission
agreement in the first instance.97 For example, in National Equipment
Rental Ltd. v. American Pecco Corp.,98 the respondent sought an order
modifying the petitioner's reservation of "the right to request other
and different relief" in addition to a demand for a specified sum. Noting
the arbitrator's power to grant any remedy or relief deemed just and
equitable,9 the Appellate Division, First Department, declined to
circumscribe the demand. For, the court was of the opinion that where
the dispute to be submitted to arbitration is adequately set forth, the
93 See, e.g., Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 85,
227 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1962); Spectrum Fabrics Corp. v. Main St. Fashions, 285 App. Div. 710,
159 N.Y.S.2d 612 (lst Dep't) aff'd 309 N.Y.2d 709, 128 N.E.2d 416, 103 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1955).
94 E.g., Amtorg Trad. Corp. v. Camden Fibre Mills, Inc., 304 N.Y. 519, 109 N.E.2d
606 (1952).
95 Wilkins v. Allen, 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902).
96 But see Granite Worsted Mills v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E.2d
168, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. Rv.
145, 175-76 (1970).
97 One situation, however, wherein the courts are compelled to supervise the arbitral
process, concerns a conflict between an arbitration agreement and an appraisal agreement
under CPLR 7601. It has recently been ruled that when such a conflict arises it is for the
court to decide which mode of private-dispute settlement takes precedence. See American
Silk Mills Corp. v. Meinhard-Commercial Corp., 35 App. Div. 2d 197, 315 N.Y.S.2d 144
(1st Dep't 1970). See also Dimson v. Elghanayan, 19 N.Y.2d 316, 227 N.E.2d, 10, 280 N.Y.S.2d
97 (1967).
98 35 App. Div. 2d 132, 314 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1st Dep't 1970).
99 AmucAN AmBrrRA ON AssocixioN, Rum-s oF Com.mRcaAL ARBrraAnON § 42; see
also Matter of De Laurendis (Cinematografica), 9 N.Y.2d 503, 174 N.E.2d 736, 215 N.Y.S.2d
60 (1961); Matter of Staldinski (Pyramid Elec. Co.), 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959).
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court should not anticipate that the arbitrator will improperly fulfill
his duties. 100
The above considerations are grounded in a voluntary agreement
to arbitrate. What, however, can be observed about the arbitral pro-
cess when the agreement to arbitrate did not emanate from an arm's-
length transaction? Can it seriously be argued that a party to a form
contract, e.g., an automobile insurance policy, has freely selected
arbitration as a forum in which to settle his disputes? Accordingly,
the question arises as to how readily the usual statements pertaining to
voluntary arbitration can be adapted to quasi-voluntary arbitration
as in the case of an insurance policy or to compulsory arbitration as
in the case of private or non-profitmaking hospitals. The latter issue
was presented to the Court of Appeals in Mount St. Mary's Hospital v.
Catherwood.10
Section 716 of the Labor Law' 0 2 provides for the compulsory
arbitration of grievances under a collective bargaining agreement and
for the compulsory arbitration of differences that may arise in drafting
a collective bargaining agreement. An application to confirm, modify,
or vacate the award is governed by article 75 of the CPLR.103 In Mount
St. Mary's Hospital the plaintiff had failed to reach an accord with an
employee's representative concerning the terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Consequently, the State Industrial Commissioner
directed that the dispute be submitted to arbitration. The hospital
balked at this order and commenced instead the instant declaratory
judgment action contending inter alia that the scope of review pre-
scribed by article 75 was unconstitutionally deficient if applied to
compulsory arbitration.
The Court immediately acknowledged that concepts applicable
to voluntary arbitration could not simply be superimposed upon those
related to compulsory arbitration, "if only because one may, under
our system, consent to almost any restriction upon or deprivation of
right, but similar restrictions . . . if compelled by government, must
accord with procedural and substantive due process."'104 Having recog-
nized this distinction the Court was faced with the crucial question:
To what degree should a court be permitted to reexamine the arbitra-
tor's decision?
100In re Auto Mechanics Lodge #1053 (Houdaille Constr. Materials, Inc.), 23 App.
Div. 2d 953, 259 N.Y.S.2d 510 (4th Dep't 1965).
10126 N.Y.2d 493, 260 NXE.2d 508, 311 N.YS32d 863 (1970).
102 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 716 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
103 Id. § 716(6)(b).
10426 N.Y.2d at 500, 260 N.E.2d at 511, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
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Basically, the Court divided its opinion into two distinct phases.
Regarding arbitration under an existing agreement, the scope of
review provided by CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii) was deemed adequate. In
the context of compulsory arbitration, however, the phrase contained
in this subsection, i.e., whether the arbitrator had exceeded his powers,
was equated with the following criterion: whether "the award is sup-
ported by evidence or other basis in reason, as may be appropriate, and
appearing in the record."'105 In the Court's estimation, this test, which
is similar to that employed in an article 78 proceeding, 0 6 would insure
that due process of law has been accorded to the participants, while
obviating the need for a time-consuming trial de novo. 1'07
Regarding the instance wherein the arbitrator is called upon to
draft a collective bargaining agreement, the Court ruled that the scope
of review under CPLR 7511(b) must be similar to that employed
when examining a legislative enactment: "The award may not be
arbitrary or capricious, and the indirect exercise of the police power by
the arbitrators must be justified by the public interest and reasonable
conditions to effect that interest."'' 08 The Court established this cri-
terion because in this instance there is no arbitration agreement from
which to discern whether the arbitrator has exceeded his powers.
Chief Judge Fuld and Judge Burke separately concurred in the
outcome but strongly protested the majority's assignment of three
significantly different meanings to the phrase "exceeded his power"
under CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii). Judge Fuld reasoned that the scope of
review provided by this subsection is not as restrictive as the majority
had described and that decisions of federal' 09 and state courts"0 dealing
with compulsory arbitration awards have sanctioned a type of review
which is narrower than that mandated by the majority. In addition,
Judge Burke noted that section 716 of the Labor Law is presumptively
constitutional"' and that the courts should not substitute their
105 Id. at 508, 260 N.E.2d at 516-17, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
106 See 8 WK&M 7803.09.
107 The hospital sought a trial de novo, citing Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Matbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73
N.E.2d 705 (1947). However, the Court of Appeals rejected this approach on the ground
that the requirement of de novo review has ebbed in the federal courts. 26 N.Y.2d at
503-04, 260 N.E.2d at 513, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 870, citing 4 DAVIS, ADmINISTRATIvE LAW § 29.09
(1958).
10826 N.Y.2d at 510, 260 N.E.2d at 517, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
109 See Gunther v. San Diego & A.E. Ry. Co., 382 U.S. 257 (1965); Brotherhood of
Trainmen v. Chicago R & I.R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
110 See Washington Arbitration Case, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437 (1969); Fairview Hosp.
Ass'n. v. Public Bldg. Ser., 241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954).
311 See Lincoln Bldg. Associates v. Barr, I N.Y.2d 413, 135 N.E.2d 801, 153 N.Y.S.2d
633 (1956).
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opinion vis-a-vis reviewability in place of the legislature's interpreta-
tion.
ATincLE 80- FEES
CPLR 8012(bX2): Sheriff must commence plenary action against at-
torney in order to fix liability for poundage fees.
CPLR 8012(b)(2) prescribes that "where an execution is vacated
or set aside1 12 the sheriff may move for an order fixing his poundage
fee and118 to pay the same to the sheriff." Unlike poundage fees based
on attachment, 114 poundage fees based on a levy of execution are col-
lectible against an attorney as well as the party whom he represents."5
Nevertheless, it was held in Jewelry Realty Corp. v. Newport, As-
sociates, Inc."6 that although the attorney may be included under this
subsection a plenary action must be commenced in order to fix his
liability.117
The plaintiff's attorney issued to the sheriff an execution which
was subsequently vacated upon application by the defendant. The
sheriff thereupon moved for an order fixing his poundage fees. Said
relief was granted against the plaintiff. But, noting that the remedy
described in CPLR 8012(b) is to be strictly limited" 8 and fearing that
the procedure employed in the instant case might cause constitutional
problems regarding due process, the court refused to grant similar
relief against the attorney unless an independent action was com-
menced.
NEtw YoRK Crry CML COURT AcT
CCA 202: Civil court reduces verdict in excess of jurisdictional limi-
tation upon plaintiff's consent.
The jurisdiction of the New York City Civil Court is restricted to
112 Under CPLR 8012(b)(1), the sheriff must actually collect the money before he is
entitled to poundage fees. Two exceptions to this rule are contained in subparagraphs
two and three: where the parties settle the claim after the execution is issued or where
the execution is vacated or set aside. An additional exception is where the sheriff is
prevented from collecting the money due to active interference by the party who issued
the execution. 8 WK&M 8012.04.
113 The courts are in disagreement regarding whether an attorney is included in the
phrase "party liable therefor" under this subsection. Compare Myers v. Grove, 242 App.
Div. 637, 272 N.Y.S. 162 (2d Dep't 1934) with Gadski Tauscher v. Graff, 44 Misc. 418, 89
N.Y.S. 1019 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1904) and Manni v. Shirtcraft Co., 6 Misc. 2d 925, 161
N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1957).
114 See CPLR 6212(b).
115 Adams v. Hopkins, 5 Johns. 252 (N.Y. 1810). See also Osterhout v. Day, 9 Johns.
114 (N.Y. 1812).
116 64 Misc. 2d 409, 314 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
117 Personeni v. Aguino, 6 N.Y.2d 35, 38, 159 N.E2d 559, 187 N.Y.S2d 764, 767
(1959). (dissenting opinion).
118 Judson v. Gray, 11 N.Y. 408 (1854).
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